

## The Crossing Of The Suez

The Crossing of the Suez Amer Mideast Research

A magisterial and profoundly perceptive survey of Britain's post-war role on the global stage, from Suez to Brexit. 'Admirably lucid and measured, as well as studded with sharp pen portraits of the key players, Britain Alone gives us the fullest long-run political and diplomatic narrative yet of Britain's fateful, tragi-comic road to Brexit.' DAVID KYNASTON 'Philip Stephens has produced that rare thing - an instant classic. Britain Alone is the codebook we need to unravel the six and a half decades between Suez and Brexit, and Stephens is a master of historical codebreaking.' PETER HENNESSY How might we celebrate Britain's undoubted strengths while accepting that we have slipped from the top table? How can we act as a great nation while no longer pretending to be a great power? How might we be European and global? In 1962 the American statesman Dean Acheson famously charged that Britain had lost an empire and failed to find a new role. Nearly sixty years later the rebuke rings true again. Britain's postwar search for its place in the world has vexed prime ministers and government since the nation's great victory in 1945: the cost of winning the war was giving up the empire. After the humiliation of Anthony Eden's Suez expedition, Britain seemed

for a time to have found an answer. Clinging to its self-image as a great island nation, it would serve as America's best friend while acknowledging its geography by signing up to membership of the European Union. Never a comfortable balancing act, for forty years it appeared to work. In 2016 David Cameron called the Brexit referendum and blew it up. Award-winning journalist Philip Stephens paints a fascinating portrait of a nation struggling to reconcile its waning power with past glory. Drawing on decades of personal contact and interviews with senior politicians and diplomats in Britain, the United States and across the capitals of Europe, *Britain Alone* is a vivid account of a proud nation struggling to admit it is no longer a great power. It is an indispensable guide to how we arrived at the state we are in. 'Compelling, informative and readable . . . offers much-needed substance.' FINANCIAL TIMES 'Fascinating.' IRISH TIMES 'Commanding.' SCOTSMAN 'A magnificent, exhilarating book, laying bare the contradictions, misunderstandings and delusions that led Britain first to build a bridge across the Channel and then bulldoze it . . . The book is much more than Brexit.' PROSPECT

An investigation of cases of deterrence failure in the Middle East -- the 1969 War of Attrition, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Egypt and Israel. Contents: Chap. 1, "Designing Around" I: The "War of Attrition," Success or Failure?

(balance of interests; the balance of capability; reputations; and crisis bargaining behavior); Chap. 2, "Designing Around" II: The Yom Kippur War, Success or Failure? (Egypt's goals and strategy; Stein's critique; the balance of capability; and crisis bargaining behavior)

Israel's victory in the 1967 'Six Day War' sowed the seeds of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. At 1400hrs on 6 October 1973 the Egyptian army launched an assault crossing of the Suez Canal. The carefully co-ordinated attack achieved complete tactical surprise. The sand embankments of the Israeli Bar-Lev Line were breached and an Israeli counterattack thrown back with heavy losses. In the second of his two-volume analysis of the Yom Kippur War, Simon Dunstan details the fighting in the Sinai, culminating in Operation Gazelle, the Israeli counterattack across the Suez Canal. Although defeated militarily, Egypt did ultimately succeed in forcing the Israelis back to the negotiating table.

Looking at the political, military and intelligence components of the Yom Kippur War, this work offers interpretations of Israel's conflict with the Arabs. The contributors, Israeli academics, some involved in the war, make a contribution to the understanding of this part of Israel's history.

Traces the life and political career of President Asad, discusses his role in the history of Syria, and shares his vision of the future of the region.

Award-winning historian Zachary Karabell tells the epic story of the greatest engineering feat of the nineteenth century--the building of the Suez Canal-- and shows how it changed the world. The dream was a waterway that would unite the East and the West, and the ambitious, energetic French diplomat and entrepreneur Ferdinand de Lesseps was the mastermind behind the project. Lesseps saw the project through fifteen years of financial challenges, technical obstacles, and political intrigues. He convinced ordinary French citizens to invest their money, and he won the backing of Napoleon III and of Egypt's prince Muhammad Said. But the triumph was far from perfect: the construction relied heavily on forced labor and technical and diplomatic obstacles constantly threatened completion. The inauguration in 1869 captured the imagination of the world. The Suez Canal was heralded as a symbol of progress that would unite nations, but its legacy is mixed. Parting the Desert is both a transporting narrative and a meditation on the origins of the modern Middle East.

The Yom Kippur War pitted Israel against Syria in the north and Egypt in the south in October 1973. Caught by surprise and surrounded by enemies, Israel relied on the flexibility and creative thinking of its senior field commanders. After Israeli forces halted the Egyptian troops on the Sinai Peninsula, Major General Ariel Sharon seized the opportunity to counterattack. He split the Egyptian army and cut off its supply lines in a

maneuver known as Operation Stouthearted Men. Sharon's audacious, controversial decision defied his superiors and produced a major victory, which many believe helped win the war for Israel. *At the Decisive Point in the Sinai* is a firsthand account of the Yom Kippur War's most intense engagement by key leaders in Sharon's division. Jacob Even, deputy division commander of the 143rd Division, and Simcha Maoz, a staff officer, recount the initial stages of the Suez crossing, examine the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) response to Egypt's surprise attack, and explain Sharon's role in the transition from defense to offense. They detail Sharon's struggle to convince his superiors of his plan and argue that an effective division commander is revealed not only by his leadership of subordinates, but also by his ability to influence his senior officers. The strategic failure of the Israeli high command during the Yom Kippur War has been widely studied, but *At the Decisive Point in the Sinai* is one of the few works to examine the experiences of field-level commanders. Even and Maoz challenge students of military leadership by offering a case study on effective generalship. In *The Military Effectiveness of Post Colonial States*, Barua examines the war fighting capabilities of Nigeria, Argentina, Egypt and India in the post colonial era. This book offers a reconceptualisation of conventional deterrence theory, and applies it to enduring rivalries in the Middle East. The work argues that many of the problems encountered in the development of deterrence theory lay in the fact that it was developed during the Cold War, when the immediate problem it had to address was

how to prevent catastrophic nuclear wars. The logic of nuclear deterrence compelled a preoccupation with the problem of stability over credibility; however, because the logic of conventional deterrence is different, the solution of the tension between credibility and stability is achieved by deference to credibility, due to the requirements of reputation and costly signaling. This book aims to narrow the gap between theory and evidence. It explores how a reconceptualization of the theory as a process that culminates in the internalization of deterrence within enduring rivalries is better suited to account for its final success: a finding that has eluded deterrence theorists for long. This interdisciplinary book will be of much interest to students of deterrence theory, strategic studies, international security, Middle Eastern studies and IR in general. Saad Shazly was Chief of Staff for the Egyptian Armed Forces during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and this is his account of that war. This updated edition includes three new chapters by the author.

An updated edition that sheds new light on one of the most dramatic reversals of military fortune in modern history. The easing of Israeli military censorship after four decades has enabled Abraham Rabinovich to offer fresh insights into this fiercest of Israel-Arab conflicts. A surprise Arab attack on two fronts on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, with Israel's reserves un-mobilized, triggered apocalyptic visions in Israel, euphoria in the Arab world, and fraught debates on both sides. Rabinovich, who covered the war for The Jerusalem Post, draws on extensive interviews and primary

source material to shape his enthralling narrative. We learn of two Egyptian nationals, working separately for the Mossad, who supplied Israel with key information that helped change the course of the war; of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan's proposal for a nuclear "demonstration" to warn off the Arabs; and of Chief of Staff David Elazar's conclusion on the fifth day of battle that Israel could not win. Newly available transcripts enable us to follow the decision-making process in real time from the prime minister's office to commanders studying maps in the field. After almost overrunning the Golan Heights, the Syrian attack is broken in desperate battles. And as Israel regains its psychological balance, General Ariel Sharon leads a nighttime counterattack across the Suez Canal through a narrow hole in the Egyptian line -- the turning point of the war. Includes 8 maps and more than 20 illustrations. Armies appear to learn more from defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967. This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt's president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain

strategic success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance. The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done.

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1900 edition. Excerpt: ... ascent of the gulf by a sailing vessel. Captain Moresby, who surveyed the gulf of Akaba in 1833, remarks: --"In this part of the Red sea the winds are drawn to the southward by very high ranges of mountains, bounding closely both sides of the gulf, and opening like a funnel to the northward in Syria; from which cause the cooler atmosphere of the northern regions is drawn into this part with such violence that the wind raises the sea into a deep and turbulent swell; the place is almost void of soundings and anchorages, except in a few spots hereafter mentioned. "Native vessels do not navigate the gulf of Akaba, and they dread crossing the Red sea near its entrance. Many vessels have been lost in See chart, No. 8a. the gulf, and very heavy weather was experienced by the Palinunts during the survey." H.M.S. Gannet, visiting the gulf for a week at the end of August

1894, found northerly winds of light to moderate force, and late Egyptian reports tend to show that better weather than that experienced in 1833 not unfrequently prevails. Soundings.--The depths in the gulf of Akaba are greater than those in the gulf of Suez, no bottom being found at 130 fathoms in the former; the shores are steep-to. The bottom of the gulf of Akaba is a continuation of the valley in which lie the Dead sea and river Jordan, both of which are much below the level of the Mediterranean. Strait of Tiran.--The entrance of the gulf of Akaba is nearly closed by the island of Tiran with its extensive reefs. The strait of Tiran is the passage on the western side of that island; it is 4 miles wide, and there are 70 fathoms within a mile of Ras Nuzerani on the western side. Reefs project to the westward from Tiran island towards the coast reef, extending half a...

A fascinating chronicle of the greatest engineering feat of the nineteenth century describes the construction of the Suez Canal, the efforts of French diplomat Ferdinand de Lesseps who masterminded the project, the goal of the construction to unite Asia and Europe, and the long-term implications of the Suez Canal in terms of the making of the modern Middle East. Reprint. 10,000 first printing.

Please note that the content of this book primarily consists of articles available from Wikipedia or other free sources online. Pages: 35. Chapters: Yom Kippur War, Operation Nickel Grass, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force Zone, Bar Lev Line, Agranat Commission, United Nations Security Council Resolution 338, Operation Badr order of battle, United Nations Security Council Resolution 340, United Nations Security Council Resolution 378, United

Nations Security Council Resolution 363, Operation Spark, United Nations Security Council Resolution 369, United Nations Security Council Resolution 368, United Nations Security Council Resolution 362, Al Jahra Brigade Group, United Nations Security Council Resolution 346, United Nations Security Council Resolution 341, Mitla Pass, Syrian parliamentary election, 1973, Syrian constitutional referendum, 1973. Excerpt: The Yom Kippur War, Ramadan War or October War (Hebrew: *Yom Kippur*; Arabic: *al-Yom al-Khamsin*), also known as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Fourth Arab-Israeli War, was fought from October 6 to 25, 1973, between Israel and a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria. The war began when the coalition launched a joint surprise attack on Israel on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in Judaism, which coincided with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Egyptian and Syrian forces crossed ceasefire lines to enter the Israeli-held Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights respectively, which had been captured and occupied since the 1967 Six-Day War. The conflict led to a near-confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, both of whom initiated massive resupply efforts to their allies during the war. The war began with a massive and successful Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal during the first three days, after which they dug in, settling into a stalemate. The Syrians coordinated their attack on the Golan Heights to coincide with the Egyptian offensive and...

This volume examines the military strategy and issues that Egyptian war planners faced during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Of major interest is the relationship between the political and military leaders and how that affected the buildup and course of the conflict. Taking this as a starting place, the author concentrates on how Soviet military doctrinal changes presented themselves between the conclusion of the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War.

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After being taken by surprise on October 6, 1973, just like the Red Army was in 1941, with its defense line breached and its political leaders unnerved, the Israeli Defense Forces managed to pull itself together. Successfully repelling Egyptian attacks, it took initiative on October 15, launching its decisive maneuver; the Crossing of the Suez. This book, published after a long struggle with Israeli Military establishment, tells the full story of this campaign, from its prewar planning, through wartime operational and technical challenges, until its successful culmination; the delivery of Israeli armored forces west of the Canal, which eventually forced Egypt to the negotiation table. The Crossing of the Suez was, at that time, the most difficult campaign the IDF had ever waged. It bred some difficult questions which remain unanswered and controversies which still resonate within the Israeli military establishment and general population. This book offers a neutral, new point of view about these controversies, based on first-hand testimonies which fully reveal the infighting among Israeli senior command; the tension between the offensive-minded Ariel Sharon and his more cautious superiors. The author, Dr. Amiram Ezov, formerly an IDF infantry and artillery officer, worked in IDF's History Department over the course of 14 years, where he published several volumes about the Southern Front in the Yom Kippur War; some of which are still classified. He has been investigating the Israeli Crossing Campaign, code name Operation Valiant, since 2006. "A fascinating book, one of the most important works dealing with that war....revealing, for the first time, the behind-the-scenes secrets of the Crossing's planning." Ronen Bergman, a senior Israeli military reporter, author of Yom Kippur War-Real Time.

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Battle of Ismailia, Valley of Tears, First Battle of Mount Hermon, Second Battle of Mount Hermon, Battle of Suez, Battles of Fort Budapest, Air Battle of El Mansoura, 1973 Syrian General Staff Headquarters Raid, Third Battle of Mount Hermon, Battle of Fort Lahtzanit, Ofira Air Battle, Battle of the Sinai, Operation Doogman 5, Operation Tagar. Excerpt: Operation Badr (Arabic: Amaliyat Badr) or Plan Badr (; Khitat Badr) was the code name for the Egyptian military operation to cross the Suez Canal and seize the Bar-Lev Line of Israeli fortifications on October 6, 1973. Launched in conjunction with a Syrian assault on the Golan Heights, this attack marked the start of the Yom Kippur War. Operation Badr was preceded by training exercises starting in 1968, operational planning from 1971 onwards and a deception operation. In the opening stages of the attack, known as The Crossing (; al-'obour), combat engineers used water cannons to rapidly clear numerous passages through the sand wall lining the east bank of the canal, laid bridges and operated ferries, allowing armor to cross. Egyptian infantry assaulted the Bar-Lev fortifications and were counterattacked by Israeli armor and infantry. The attack surprised the Israelis, and by October 7 the crossing was complete, and the east bank of the canal was occupied by five Egyptian infantry divisions. The infantry proceeded to establish defensive positions in bridgeheads spanning the 160 kilometres (99 mi) front. Following a lull in the fighting on October 7, Israeli armor reserves arrived at the front and launched a counterattack opposite the city of Ismailia. The Egyptian forces were successful in employing anti-tank weapons to repel the Israeli armor and advanced once more. By the end of October 8, ...

It has often been argued that Arab states are arbitrary political creations, lacking historical or present legitimacy. This book, first published in 1990, provides a different picture of 'the Arab

state', drawing on historical, economic, philosophical and sociological perspectives to give a balanced and convincing view of the complex reality of contemporary Arab politics. The contributors, from the Arab countries, from Europe and the United States, investigate the roots of the nation state in the Arab world, evaluating in particular the economic bases of individual states. They discuss the evolution of Arab societies and the way this is reflected in different states, and examine the problems of domestic and international integration in the Arab context. Original and comprehensive in its findings, this is an essential text on the fundamental political structure of the Arab world. Its interdisciplinary breadth makes possible an entirely new reading of the political reality of the Middle East.

The next desert war the United States fights could be against an enemy more comparable to us in training, motivation, and technology than the recent conflict in the Persian Gulf. The Middle East is a dangerous part of the world where we have limited experience in the use of high technology weapons, or in large-scale combat even given the recent war against Iraq. Since we have limited experience in these areas, this thesis analyzes two of the most recent historical examples of such combat from the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars to reveal conclusions useful to U. S. war fighters. This thesis examines the Battle of Um Katef, Abu Ageila from the 1967 War, and the Sinai Campaign from the 1973 War. They were examined primarily from secondary sources, using the U. S. Army battlefield operating systems, as the framework to evaluate success or failure. The resulting keys to success or reasons for failure were then further evaluated against the four tenets of U. S. Airland Battle Doctrine (Agility, Initiative, Depth, and Synchronization). The result of this investigation is a number of conclusions regarding modern combined arms combat. These conclusions are categorized as

strengths or weaknesses and presented as lessons learned. Surprisingly enough, none of the lessons learned proved to be environment specific.

Pan-Arab unionism ignited passions and dominated politics in the Middle East throughout the 1950s and 1960s and has continued to reassert itself periodically. In this elegantly written study, Malik Mufti investigates the persistence and the failure of pan-Arab initiatives, examining their significance in the political development of Syria and Iraq.

Israel's victory in the 1967 'Six Day War' sowed the seeds of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. At 1400hrs on 6 October 1973 the Egyptian army launched an assault crossing of the Suez Canal. The carefully co-ordinated attack achieved complete tactical surprise. The sand embankments of the Israeli Bar-Lev Line were breached and an Israeli counterattack thrown back with heavy losses. In the second of his two-volume analysis of the Yom Kippur War, Simon Dunstan details the fighting in the Sinai, culminating in Operation Gazelle, the Israeli counterattack across the Suez Canal. Although defeated militarily Egypt did ultimately succeed in forcing the Israelis back to the negotiating table.

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The Yom Kippur War, Ramadan War, or October War also known as the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, was fought from October 6 to 25, 1973, by a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria against Israel. Yom Kippur War Index Chapter 1: The war Story 1.1 Events leading up to the war 1.2 War objectives and areas of combat 1.3 Lead-up to the surprise attack 1.4 Egyptian and Syrian military exercises 1.5 Lack of Israeli pre-emptive attack Chapter 2: Course of the war 2.1 Egyptian attack 2.2 Failed Israeli counter-attack 2.3 Temporary stabilization 2.4

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The Egyptian failed attack 2.5 Israel planned attack considerations 2.6 Israeli breakthrough – Crossing the canal 2.7 Securing the bridgehead 2.8 Egyptian response to the Israeli crossing 2.9 Israeli forces across the Suez 2.10 The ceasefire and further battles 2.11 Egypt's trapped Third Army 2.12 Post-war battles 2.13 Final situation on the Egyptian front 2.14 War in the Golan Heights 2.15 Successful defense of the Quneitra Gap by the 7th Armored Brigade 2.16 Syrian breakthrough in the Southern Golan 2.17 The collapse of the 188th Armored Brigade 2.18 Israel retakes the southern Golan 2.19 Naval War Chapter 3: Atrocities against Israeli prisoners 3.1 Egyptian atrocities Chapter 4: Participation by other states 4.1 Aid to Egypt and Syria 4.2 Soviet active aid 4.3 Soviet threat of intervention 4.4 Other countries 4.5 US-Soviet naval standoff Chapter 5 : Weapons 5.1 Home front during the war 5.2 Casualties Chapter 6: Post-ceasefire 6.1 Disengagement agreement 6.2 Response in Israel 6.3 Response in Egypt 6.4 Response in Syria 6.5 Response in the Soviet Union Chapter 7: Long-term effects Examines how Israel was caught by surprise in the opening stages of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Based on many formerly undisclosed intelligence and military documents, the secret protocols of discussions on the eve of the war, and interviews with relevant figures, The Watchman Fell Asleep is a compelling account of Israel's intelligence failure before the 1973 Arab attack known as the Yom Kippur War. The Hebrew version of this book was awarded the Tshetshik Prize for Strategic Studies on Israel's Security in 2001, and the Israeli Political Science Association's Best Book Award in 2002. Available here in English for the first time, Uri Bar-Joseph has crafted an authoritative explanation of the most traumatic event in Israel's stormy history and one of the biggest strategic military surprises of the twentieth century. Uri Bar-Joseph is Professor of International Relations at Haifa University. He is the author of

Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States: The United States, Israel, and Britain and The Best of Enemies: Israel and Transjordan in the War of 1948.

The recent revolution in Egypt has shaken the Arab world to its roots. The most populous Arab country and the historical center of Arab intellectual life, Egypt is a linchpin of the US's Middle East strategy, receiving more aid than any nation except Israel. This is not the first time that the world and has turned its gaze to Egypt, however. A half century ago, Egypt under Nasser became the putative leader of the Arab world and a beacon for all developing nations. Yet in the decades prior to the 2011 revolution, it was ruled over by a sclerotic regime plagued by nepotism and corruption. During that time, its economy declined into near shambles, a severely overpopulated Cairo fell into disrepair, and it produced scores of violent Islamic extremists such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mohammed Atta. In *The Struggle for Egypt*, Steven Cook--a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations--explains how this parlous state of affairs came to be, why the revolution occurred, and where Egypt might be headed next. A sweeping account of Egypt in the modern era, it incisively chronicles all of the nation's central historical episodes: the decline of British rule, the rise of Nasser and his quest to become a pan-Arab leader, Egypt's decision to make peace with Israel and ally with the United States, the assassination of Sadat, the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood, and--finally--the demonstrations that convulsed Tahrir Square and overthrew an entrenched regime.

Throughout Egypt's history, there has been an intense debate to define what Egypt is, what it stands for, and its relation to the world. Egyptians now have an opportunity to finally answer these questions. Doing so in a way that appeals to the vast majority of Egyptians, Cook notes, will be difficult but ultimately necessary if Egypt is to become an economically dynamic and

politically vibrant society.

Paper aims to use the programming codes in calculating the values of neutrosophic grades and their representation in proving the certainty and uncertainty associated with the data of navigational projects development in the Suez Canal, Egypt. Added to, we reach a more descriptive of the data in terms of certainty and uncertainty, and that is through the neutrosophic representation of both the total revenue and the revenues of the Suez Canal from the transit carriers and ships.

Tectonic Dyssynchrony, as Karim describes, is a loss of synchronous motion of the earth's tectonic plates. Professor Karim, a doctorate in geophysics from a very prestigious American university, has a special interest in earth's seismic activity. He believes the tectonic dyssynchrony is responsible for an erratic gliding motion of the tectonic plates, thereby causing disastrous earthquakes, tsunamis, sinkholes, and a rare entity labeled as "spontaneous human combustion" or SHC for short. The book describes an increase in frequency and intensity of earthquakes and tsunamis and also formation of sinkholes in our recent times; the sinkhole in Yamal Peninsula of Siberia was 262 feet wide! Many theories are advanced for the increase in earth's seismic activities, which are felt on the earth's surface, manifesting as massive tsunamis, just as the one seen in Japan recently and a more recent massive extrusion of lava on the island of Hawaii. Professor Karim believes that the erratic behavior of the tectonic plates is due to an excessive removal of very highly viscous crude oil from the earth's crust and its replacement with wash water. He postulates that the crude oil trapped within the inner crust of the earth serves as greasing material that facilitates smooth gliding of the tectonic plates and conversely removal of the lubricant, he believes, is the cause for jerky

tectonic gliding. He believes that an incessant removal of the crude oil over the years has now reached a point where the minimum level of lubricant optimally required for a smooth gliding action is exhausted, thereby causing dyssynchrony in the plate motion or simply putting an erratic and jerky motion of the tectonic plates. Karim's research put him on crossroads with the Big Oil. Big Oil was fighting on many fronts; the state governments and also the federal government had filed lawsuits against the Big Oil. Oklahoma town meetings and street protests were everyday frontline news, and some universities researching the effects of greenhouse gases had contradicted many of the Big Oil-sponsored researches. Even some private foundations had sued the Big Oil. Big Oil was afraid of a greater governmental oversight, which may even prompt an injunction supporting a moratorium on future drilling all because of the irrefutable findings presented by Professor Karim's research. In an attempt to thwart Professor Karim's research, Big Oil offered Karim a very lucrative contract to join the research team of the Big Oil, a contract that Karim decided to forego as the contract deprived him the intellectual property right to his own research. The Big Oil attempted several illegal means to stop Karim, but he persisted, by luck or sheer perseverance. They even staged a car accident that demolished his Mini to smithereens, but Karim suffered only a few bruises. Karim was forced to leave the world-renowned and prestigious Massachusetts College of Technology in Boston and go into hiding in a third-world country where he continued his research incognito and used an alias as his life was under a constant threat. The story is a science-based fiction that will take the reader on a journey along with Karim on his travel from Africa to California to Boston and onward to Madagascar, sharing his research, observations, experiences, and love for trivia. The story will take the searching mind to a futuristic world of artificial

intelligence—assisted holographic presentation and a science of induced (man-made) seismicity, the discovery and use of the measure of gravitational waves, and onward to a mystical world of beliefs and predictions. The book will incite the reader to think out of the box and be more like Karim in their outlook—a world citizen.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War ended differently than the three previous conflicts between these two countries. As a result of this conflict, the Egyptian Armed Forces regained its confidence and pride and Egypt achieved its political and military objectives. Prior to the conflict, military analysts and intelligence experts believed there could be no war between these enemies. Israel was satisfied with the status quo and Egypt would not begin a conflict because the experts believed there was no way the Egyptians could win. The major difference between these conflicts and the outcomes was the appointment of General Ismail to lead the Egyptian Armed Forces. The purpose of this paper is to outline the strategic leadership of General Ismail prior to the conflict. General Ismail had extensive military education and experience at all levels of command which led to his selection as the Minister of War. General Ismail used his education and experience to craft a strategic vision for the Armed Forces. That vision was rooted in an understanding of his country's and his enemy's political strategies. He knew the strengths and weakness of his country and that of his enemy which he melded into a comprehensive military strategy and a concept of operations. His use of surprise and the military crossing of the Suez Canal and Bar Lev Line are regarded by many military analysts as exceptional military achievements. General Ismail's strategic vision was comprehensive, innovative, and a model for senior leaders.

Personal account of the Israeli military response to the Egyptian attack launched across the

Suez Canal in 1973, elaborating upon strategy, logistics, and the human intensity of involvement

Analyse af den arabiske verdens muligheder for at genvinde de af Israel besatte territorier. Bogen gennemgår landenes politik, de væbnede styrker og våbenindustri med eventuelle kernevåben, såvel stærke som svage sider. Bogen fortæller også om supermagternes forhold til de konfliktramte stater og om verdensopinionen.

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